*Structural constraints.* The framework treats housing and land as constitutive infrastructure on the same logic as the legal system or public-health infrastructure: it is not a prohibition on holding or improving land, and it derives the legitimacy of individual land tenure directly from the contribution a holder actually makes to what they build and maintain, so the constraint falls not on holding land but on capturing the value the shared structure created around it. Within that constraint, architectures that let a holder capture unimproved site value are precluded; architectures that use land-use control to convert a fixed stock into the active foreclosure of others' access are precluded; and architectures that collect the recouped value as an ongoing cash demand against a current occupant, rather than at transfer, are precluded. Specific reform paths (the rate and base of land-value capture, the zoning and tenure designs through which the anti-exclusion constraint is met) are underdetermined, but the structural preclusions hold at the design-pressure level.

*Cross-domain couplings.* These constraints couple [§9.8](<9.8 Housing.md>) to four adjacent domains. Site-value capture couples it to the economy ([§9.7](<9.7 Economy.md>)) at the collective-investment interface: unimproved land value is the cleanest instance of the structural extraction [§9.7](<9.7 Economy.md>) defines at the macro level, so the derivation that makes housing's site-value capture necessary is the same derivation that makes progressive taxation and insurance-redundancy necessary elsewhere in the economic architecture, and reform of one without the other leaves the shared logic only partially installed. It couples to rights ([§9.1](<9.1 Rights.md>)) on the participation-condition side, since stable shelter is the spatial precondition from which nearly every other participation condition is exercised, and a floor that fails at housing fails upstream of where the other floors can even be tested. It couples to justice ([§9.13](<9.13 Justice.md>)) on the reparative-obligation side: the redlining-era site-value gap [§9.8.4](<9.8.4 What is Confirmed.md>) confirms is a present-day, measurable instance of the historical extraction the framework's contribution-versus-extraction logic reads on its own terms, and the specific reparative architecture that answers it is a justice-domain design question the present derivation routes rather than resolves. And it couples to installation ([§9.15](<9.15 Installation.md>)) on the transition side: the deferral cap, interest-rate formula, resale-restriction formula, and the broader transition path for households whose savings are held as home equity are installation questions whose shape (capped, fairly priced, occupancy-verified, formula-restricted at resale) the present derivation commits to even where the specific numbers remain open.

*Bounded field-engagement.* The framework is not a prohibition on private land tenure, and the point bears saying outright: it licenses individually-held and individually-improved land on the contribution logic and precludes only the capture of the site value that logic does not license, placing it in the field with the Georgist land-value-capture tradition and with the classical-liberal convergence on land taxation as the least distortionary instrument, against both the propertarian reading that treats unimproved site value as an ordinary contributed asset and the decommodification reading that would abolish individual land tenure to answer an extraction the site/improvement split already answers without abolition. It also predicts its own opposition: incumbent political resistance to land-use liberalization and to site-value capture will be sustained and well-organized, because the homevoter mechanism that makes local land-use control valuable to incumbents is the same mechanism the framework precludes, so transition design has to anticipate and route around that resistance, not because the resistance is illegitimate to voice but because it is structurally predictable given whose asset value is at stake. And it locates a structural pressure-relief: non-market construction and community land trusts give a jurisdiction a supply-side lever that does not depend on winning the zoning fight everywhere at once, so reform agendas that pair site-value capture with non-market supply expansion cost less political capital per unit of housing delivered than agendas that rely on zoning liberalization alone.

These implications are derived under engagement with the contested property-theory and land-use-governance traditions [§9.8.1](<9.8.1 What is Disputed.md>) names at premise: the propertarian entitlement tradition (Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* 1974; Rothbard, *For a New Liberty* 1973; Epstein, *Takings* 1985), the homevoter local-control tradition (Fischel, *The Homevoter Hypothesis* 2001), the land-decommodification tradition (Engels, *The Housing Question* 1872; Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* 1973 and *Rebel Cities* 2012), and the communitarian cross-pressure (Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent* 1996; MacIntyre, *After Virtue* 1981), which [§9.8.1](<9.8.1 What is Disputed.md>) engages at section length, so that the implications stated here apply under that engagement.

What the framework leaves open is the specific rate and base of land-value capture, the zoning and tenure designs through which the anti-exclusion constraint is met, the deferral-cap, interest-rate, and resale-restriction formulas and the broader transition path for households whose savings are held as home equity, the community-land-trust and non-market-construction supply-side architecture, and the specific reparative architecture that answers the redlining-era site-value gap [§9.8.4](<9.8.4 What is Confirmed.md>) confirms. Where multiple designs satisfy the constraints, the framework leaves the choice to the design literatures, the empirical record, and the recognized direction of the population through [§9.3](<9.3 Representation.md>) (Representation).

Condensed to a single thesis, the [§9.8](<9.8 Housing.md>) argument across its five subsections comes to this: housing and land are legitimate individually-held and individually-improved infrastructure, and the un-earned component of their value, the site value the shared structure around a parcel creates, is not; holding both of these simultaneously (licensing the tenure while precluding the capture, and precluding exclusionary foreclosure while licensing local governance of genuinely local concerns) is what the framework's structural position on housing consists in. The confirmation record shows that split-rate and land-value-tax jurisdictions from Pennsylvania to Estonia produce the predicted construction and anti-speculation effects, that restrictive-zoning metros produce the predicted paired exclusion-and-extraction effect against Houston- and Tokyo-style liberalized comparators, that existing deferral programs produce the predicted no-displacement effect, and that the community-land-trust record and the persistence of the redlining-era site-value gap confirm the durable-affordability and reparative predictions respectively; where the record is thin (the full provision-cost-indexed allowance design) it is thin in the direction the framework predicts rather than against it. The institutional-design implications follow as a single package: site-value capture, anti-exclusion zoning reform, deferral-until-transfer protections, and non-market supply expansion are not separate reform preferences but one structural obligation derived from the same account of what a fixed, non-substitutable, community-valued resource may and may not be made to do.


---

← [9.8.4 What is Confirmed](<9.8.4 What is Confirmed.md>) | [9.9 Education](<9.9 Education.md>) →
