The foregoing argument owns a substantive metalogical position: a position *about* logic, not a contribution *within* logic. The framework proposes no new axioms, no new operators, no new semantic clauses; temporal logic, spatial logic, and the formal-ontology and mereology traditions already exist as developed by Prior, Tarski, Leśniewski, Quine, Simons, Lowe, and others. What the framework offers is a theory of why there is logic at all, and why these particular logics. The position has four commitments.

*Logic is metaphysically grounded.* The framework ties its classical inferential floor to a joint determinacy-and-LEM commitment along T, S, and Φ. LEM is the Law of Excluded Middle; it does not by itself entail that every claim takes exactly one of two semantic values, so bivalence is an additional commitment rather than a gloss on LEM. The framework rejects the alternative metalogical foundations on offer. Logic is not convention (against Carnap-style pluralism, *The Logical Syntax of Language* -(Carnap, Rudolf, 1937); the three logics are dictated by Reality's axes, not chosen for utility). Logic is not transcendental condition of thought (against Kant -(Kant, I., (1781) 1998) *Critique of Pure Reason*; the framework grounds logic in Reality, not in mind). Logic is not free-floating formalism (against Hilbert -(Hilbert, David, 1899) *Foundations of Geometry* on formalist readings; logic has real referents, per the reverse derivation at [§2.9](<2.9 Precedent Convergence.md>)). Logic is not psychological construction for empirical existence-claims (against intuitionist treatments of empirical bivalence; (Brouwer, L. E. J., 1907) and (Heyting, Arend, 1956) raise legitimate concerns about unbounded mathematical claims, but the framework restricts its LEM-application to existence-claims along the three Conditions, where the bivalence is empirical not unbounded-mathematical).

Each rejected position captures something real that the framework preserves. Carnap is right that higher-stratum axiomatic choice has a conventional moment; the framework's anti-conventionalism applies only to the floor LEM and the three axis-logics, not to choices among axiom systems above them. Kant is right that logical structure shows up wherever cognition occurs; the framework adds that the cognizer is a T-S-Φ instantiator, so cognition tracks logic because both track Reality. Hilbert is right that the formal disciplines admit consistent axiomatization independently of semantic interpretation; the framework adds that, for the three logics, the axiomatizations also have real referents per the reverse derivation at [§2.9](<2.9 Precedent Convergence.md>).

*Logic is structurally individuated.* There are exactly as many basic logics as Reality has existence-axes. Three: temporal, spatial, and substantial. The modal axis is screened out by Condition-Individuation's irreducibility clause ([§2.6.11](<2.6.11 No Fourth Condition.md>)): the Modal Identity identifies □◇C with □(T∧S∧Φ), so the modal-axis is the modal-side of the same Nature rather than a fourth independent axis. Not arbitrarily many: the framework rejects unrestricted logical pluralism (Beall, JC, and Greg Restall, 2006) *Logical Pluralism*, according to which any number of logics are correct for any number of domains with no metaphysical privileging. The three logics are axis-individuated, not domain-individuated: what counts as an axis is determined by the Lemma's two-clause screen, not by pragmatic choice. Not just one: the framework also rejects unrestricted logical monism, according to which a single logic is the one true logic. LEM at the bare floor is shared across axes, but each axis develops its own axioms beyond LEM, and those axiom-systems are not inter-translatable.

*Logic has real referents.* The claims of temporal, spatial, and substantial logic are determinately true or false because they are about real features of Reality. The framework is realist about the three formal disciplines. This realism extends the realism about Nature established at [§2.8](<2.8 The Whole Line.md>): just as Nature is real — not a useful construct, theoretical posit, or regulative ideal — the three Conditions are real, and so are the inferential systems native to them. This is the realism the reverse derivation in [§2.9](<2.9 Precedent Convergence.md>) needs to do its work (a formal discipline has determinately true-or-false claims only if its claims have real referents), and the framework owns it as a substantive commitment rather than a methodological convenience. That the commitment is more than a posit (that logic's referents are real rather than framework-relative) is defended against the strongest deflationary challenge at [§4.1.8](<4.1.8 Metaontological Deflationism.md>), on the deflationist's own criterion of objectivity.

*Logic is foundational to the sciences.* Logic is the root layer of the stratified architecture developed at [§2.10.2](<2.10.2 The Stratified Architecture.md>). Physics is Layer 2: empirical-nomological work conducted within the three logics; higher sciences branch from physics. This commitment is anti-physicalist in a specific way: physics does not ground logic; logic grounds physics. And it is anti-scientistic in a specific way: metaphysics is not eliminable in favor of empirical science; metaphysics is the discipline of the root layer, with its own object and method that empirical science presupposes but cannot itself articulate.

*The shared classical floor.* The four commitments together describe a nested structure within the stratified architecture rather than competing horizontal options. The framework adopts both LEM and determinacy/bivalence for the targeted existence-claims along T, S, and Φ. The classical inferential apparatus follows from that package and the consequence rules separately adopted, not from LEM alone. Above the shared LEM floor, each axis develops its own axiom-system encoding its native structure: temporal modalities for T, region-relations for S, identity-and-persistence for Φ. The three axiom-systems are not inter-translatable above the LEM floor (a commitment motivated by each axis's native structure, [§2.10.1](<2.10.1 Three Distinct Logics.md>) — the Lemma's irreducibility clause individuates the axes but does not alone entail it), but they share the bivalent inferential floor below. The framework is therefore neither one-true-logic monism (one axiom-system across all domains) nor unrestricted pluralism (any number of logics for any number of domains by pragmatic choice); it is LEM-monist at the floor and axiom-system-pluralist above, with the pluralism dictated by Reality's existence-axes rather than by convention. This shared LEM floor is what allows the framework to keep the bivalent inferential apparatus universally binding on existence-claims while admitting axis-specific structure native to each Condition.

*The answer to the foundational question of philosophy of logic.* Where does logical normativity come from? Philosophy of logic has long asked. Frege -(Frege, Gottlob, 1879) *Begriffsschrift*; -(Frege, Gottlob, 1893–1903) *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* located it in the Third Realm of abstract objects. Wittgenstein's early *Tractatus* -(Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1921) 1961) located it in the limits of representable language. Wittgenstein's late *Philosophical Investigations* -(Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1953) located it in linguistic practice. Quine -(Quine, W. V. O., 1951) *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*; -(Quine, W. V. O., 1969) *Epistemology Naturalized* located it in the web of belief. Kant -(Kant, I., (1781) 1998) located it in transcendental conditions of cognition. Logical anti-exceptionalism (Williamson, Timothy, 2017) *Doing Philosophy*; (Hjortland, Ole Thomassen, 2017) *Anti-exceptionalism About Logic* locates it in continuity with empirical science.

The framework's answer: logical normativity comes from Reality's three existence-axes. Its classical floor is binding on the targeted existence-claims because clause 1 of the [§2.6.11](<2.6.11 No Fourth Condition.md>) criterion combines determinacy with LEM; neither component should be treated as deriving the other. The three logics are binding on claims within their domains because each axis carries its native structure (the axioms regimenting its native modalities). The normativity is grounded in what Reality is: not in convention, not in mind, not in language, not in practice, not in web-of-belief. The framework is therefore a *metaphysical-grounding* account of logical normativity.

*Engagement-table.* How the framework's metalogical position stands relative to the existing options in philosophy of logic. *Rejected* marks a position the framework denies; *partial* marks a position the framework affirms on one point and parts from on another.

- *Conventionalism / Carnapian pluralism* (Carnap, Rudolf, 1937): rejected. The three logics are not conventional choices; they are dictated by Reality's axes.
- *Formalism* (Hilbert, on formalist readings): rejected. Logic has real referents per the reverse derivation of [§2.9](<2.9 Precedent Convergence.md>).
- *Logicism* (Frege, Gottlob, 1879); (Whitehead, Alfred North, and Bertrand Russell, 1910–1913): partial. Logic is foundational, but to all empirical inquiry, not just to mathematics.
- *Intuitionism* (Brouwer, L. E. J., 1907); (Heyting, Arend, 1956): partial. LEM may fail for unbounded mathematical claims; it applies determinately to existence-claims along the three Conditions.
- *Unrestricted logical pluralism* (Beall, JC, and Greg Restall, 2006): rejected. Exactly three basic logics, axis-individuated, not arbitrarily many.
- *Logical monism* (single true logic): partial. LEM at the bare floor is shared; axis-specific axiom-systems differentiate.
- *Logical anti-exceptionalism* (Williamson, Timothy, 2017); (Hjortland, Ole Thomassen, 2017): partial. Logic is continuous with metaphysics (root-layer inquiry), not directly with empirical science; the sciences operate within logic but do not revise logic from above.
- *Structural realism / naturalized metaphysics* (Sider, Theodore, 2011) *Writing the Book of the World*; (Ladyman, J., and D. Ross, with D. Spurrett and J. Collier, 2007) *Every Thing Must Go*: partial. The framework agrees Reality has joints to be carved; it disagrees about which joints and about the relationship of metaphysics to physics. The framework's joints are the three Conditions, and metaphysics is the root-layer discipline distinct from any empirical science.

The framework's metalogical position combines four commitments: metaphysical grounding (the logics' normativity from Reality), structural individuation (exactly three basic logics, by Reality's existence-axes), realism (about the disciplines' referents), and foundationalism (logic as the root layer of the sciences).[^2-10-3-metalogical-position-ch4]

*The position's existential reach.* The four commitments do work beyond the metalogical question: they yield a convergence line confirming the necessity already derived at [§2.8.5](<2.8.5 Necessity of Nature.md>). The line is *confirming-and-consistent* rather than *independent*: it runs through earlier framework machinery (the cogito chain at [§2.8.2](<2.8.2 Nature Cannot Be Denied.md>) and the further [§3.3](<3.3 Triconditional Necessity Negative Account.md>) development of we-are-T-S-Φ-instantiators) rather than around it, and reaches the same modal conclusion through a different inferential path. If the three logics are necessary (commitment 1: grounded in Reality's existence-axes, not contingent on convention or mind) and have real referents (commitment 3: the disciplines' claims are about real features of Reality), then what the three logics describe is necessary. T-logic is the logic *of* T, not a logic *over* contents drawn from some independent T-domain; the necessity of T-logic and the necessity of T as a real feature of Reality are not two facts but one. Logic and Reality stand as map and terrain: distinguishable as modes of articulation, not as separate structures; the necessity that runs through the map is the necessity that runs through the terrain. The same holds for S-logic and Φ-logic. We are T-S-Φ instantiators: we exist along all three axes; we act, persist, and change as the entities the three logics describe ([§2.8.2](<2.8.2 Nature Cannot Be Denied.md>) *Cogito Ergo Muto*; the point is developed further at [§3.3](<3.3 Triconditional Necessity Negative Account.md>)). The closure follows: we instantiate what is necessarily described. Our structural Conditions are necessary even where our particular instantiation is contingent ([§2.8.4](<2.8.4 Necessity Precedes Contingency.md>) *Necessity Precedes Contingency*). The chapter's metalogical position is therefore a convergence line confirming the necessity theorem already established at [§2.8.5](<2.8.5 Necessity of Nature.md>): not by way of the change-bottleneck and the structural-Conditions argument, but by way of logic's necessity transferring through realism-about-logic to the axes the logics are *of*. The convergence instantiates the precedent-convergence pattern catalogued at [§2.9](<2.9 Precedent Convergence.md>) across the chapter's outward-facing literature, this time arising within the framework's own architecture rather than between the framework and contemporary work. The two lines converge on the same modal conclusion from different directions: Reality carries three Conditions, the Conditions are necessary, and we participate in their necessity at the structural level.

[^2-10-3-metalogical-position-ch4]: The metalogical position (logic as metaphysically grounded, structurally individuated, realist, and foundational to the sciences) is engaged across several Chapter 4 sections. Carnap-style conventionalism is the principal rejected alternative on the source of logical normativity ([§4.1.7](<4.1.7 Modal Conventionalism.md>)); Quine presses web-of-belief and naturalized epistemology ([§4.1.6](<4.1.6 Quinean Modal Skepticism.md>)); Sider's *Writing the Book of the World* is the closest structural-realist neighbor, with divergent joint-carving ([§4.4.7](<4.4.7 Sider's Structuralism.md>)); Ladyman and Ross's naturalized metaphysics is the partial-agreement reference for the metaphysics-physics relation ([§4.3.9](<4.3.9 Structural Realism.md>)); Tegmark asks whether logic is mathematical rather than metaphysical ([§4.3.7](<4.3.7 Mathematical Universe Hypothesis.md>)); quietism and logical anti-exceptionalism are pressed by (Williamson, Timothy, 2017) and (Hjortland, Ole Thomassen, 2017) ([§4.1.9](<4.1.9 Wittgensteinian Quietism.md>)); and deflationist accounts target logic's normativity ([§4.1.8](<4.1.8 Metaontological Deflationism.md>)).


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← [2.10.2 The Stratified Architecture](<2.10.2 The Stratified Architecture.md>) | [3. Convergence](<3. Convergence.md>) →
