Three readings have been named: the Modal Identity ([§2.6.6](<2.6.6 Modal Identity.md>)), the Triconditional Cross-Entailment ([§2.6.7](<2.6.7 Triconditional Cross-Entailment.md>)), and the Ontological Identity ([§2.6.8](<2.6.8 Ontological Identity.md>)). Do they pick out three facts, or one?

The Triconditions are the same in each. The T that appears in the Modal Identity (◇C ↔ T∧S∧Φ) is the same T that appears in the Triconditional Cross-Entailment and the same T the Ontological Identity names as the being-condition of any real thing. No equivocation runs across the three uses: each letter names the same Condition, and the co-extension established across §[§2.6](<2.6 Triconditionality of Nature.md>) is the co-extension of these Conditions, not of three different trios of Conditions that happen to share notation.

What the three differ in is not the Triconditions but the layer. The Ontological Identity takes the Triconditions at the physical layer: T, S, and Φ *are* what any being *consists in*, what any physical thing is, across distance, through time. The Triconditional Cross-Entailment takes it at the law-of-physics layer: any regularity is a regularity in what persists (Φ), across distinction (S), through succession (T): the Triconditions in lawful operation. The Modal Identity takes it at the logical layer: what can be the case is what can host T, S, and Φ together: the Triconditions in modal form. Three layers, the same Triconditions.

The reduction runs from the physical layer up. A physical thing is a being acting across distance through time: it is Φ distinguished in S and succeeding in T. That is not a description of a physical thing; it *is* what being a physical thing *consists in*. There is no residue after the Triconditions specify the being: no further constituent that makes the being physical in some way the Triconditions did not capture. The Ontological Identity is the claim that being physical and instantiating T∧S∧Φ *are* the same fact, not two facts that match.[^2-6-9-thin-loaded-descent-ch4]

The next reduction follows at the level of lawful structure. A physical law constrains what physical things do; on a regularity account, it is described through patterns in that activity, while governing and primitivist accounts deny that laws reduce to regularities. Either way, its instances involve distinguishable states (S) of beings or realizers (Φ) across transitions or dependency-order (T). Physics is not a substrate beside the physical: the nomological reading describes the lawful organization of the same structural field the ontological reading describes from the side of being. The Triconditional Cross-Entailment is the Ontological Identity read through law, not a commitment to a regularity theory of laws.

The final reduction closes at the logical layer. ◇C ↔ T∧S∧Φ does not add possibility to the Triconditions as a further property. It names what possibility is: the co-instantiation of the Triconditions. But the co-instantiation is what the Ontological Identity names as the activity of being and what the Triconditional Cross-Entailment names as lawful regularity. Possibility is not a third domain. It is the Triconditions' modal description: what must hold for the Triconditions to hold anywhere. The Modal Identity is the Ontological Identity described as possibility.

*What is identified.* The three readings are one Nature read under three lenses: the *Triunity of Nature*. The readings converge because each names the same inseparability of T, S, and Φ from a different side: Modal from possibility, Nomological from cross-entailment among the roles, Ontological from being-instantiation. The modal, the nomological, and the ontological are not three layers connected isomorphically. Possibility, laws, and being are not three layers: they are one fact described modally, nomologically, and ontologically. What moves between the three is identity under description, not structural analogy. The compression here does not mean empirical physics reduces to formal logic; it means the lawful structure physics describes and the modal structure logic names are the same Triconditions under different descriptions. Each layer resolves into the same logical form. This identity is established here for Reality as the change-hosting structural complex: the Triconditions read under three lenses. Whether any candidate necessary ground could stand outside it (in particular one specified as standing outside change, the classical theist's atemporal ground, granted only the thin Conditions at [§2.6.3](<2.6.3 Extension's Two Conditions.md>)) is not assumed here but settled at [§2.8.6](<2.8.6 Exclusivity of Nature.md>). There, Exclusivity of Nature (Theorem 7) shows any such ground either instantiates the Triconditions in the loaded sense or is a variant of ∅.

A modal-collapse worry has to be flagged and disarmed. The Triunity says the three readings are one fact under three lenses, but possibility and being are typically taken as distinct categories (some things are possible without being actual, and *being possible* is not the same property as *being actual*). The Triunity does not collapse this distinction at the level of individual propositions. It compresses at the level of the structural Triconditions: what makes ◇C true, what any actual being is, and what any lawful regularity describes is the same Triconditions (T, S, Φ) under three logical-categorical readings. These are three readings of the Triconditions, not three properties of one proposition. The distinction between *being possible* and *being actual* survives at the propositional level; the compression operates between *what makes possibility possible* and *what makes actuality actual*: at that structural level, the answer is the same Triconditions, read under modal, nomological, and ontological lenses.

That shared structure is logical form. These three are logical-categorical readings of one Nature, drawn from the three primary lenses analytic metaphysics has developed: necessity, law, being. The three logics of the Conditions (succession, distinction, carrying-through) and the three logics of the readings (necessity, law, being) are two independent axes of the same logical form. The two axes carry different warrants, neither a stipulation: on the Condition side, the three enumerate what change requires, and any proposed fourth collapses into one of them or fails the role (the Condition-Individuation of [§2.6.11](<2.6.11 No Fourth Condition.md>), delivered there as a burden-shift rather than an a priori exclusion); on the readings side, necessity, law, and being are the categorical lenses the tradition has developed, and no candidate fourth reading has resisted resolution into one of the three — a standing challenge rather than a closed proof. The Conditions and the readings *are* one logic read along two independent axes. Logic is not a fourth result alongside the Modal Identity, the Triconditional Cross-Entailment, and the Ontological Identity. It is the perspective from which the three are readings, and the shape the three share: what makes their convergence intelligible at all.

The reduction runs one level deeper. If the three are three descriptions of one fact, the descriptions cannot come apart at the register line. Any description in any register already deploys the vocabulary of every register, because the fact it describes *is* the fact every register describes.

A physical description *is* already a nomological description *is* already a modal description: not by translation, but because the registers are angles on one thing. Point at a stone in the physical register and you are pointing at what persists through time (Φ), stands across distance (S), and holds in succession (T). The same pointing, in the modal register, points at what can be the case. No phenomenal description, unpacked, turns out not already analytical. No analytical description, grounded, turns out not already phenomenal.

(Sellars, Wilfrid, 1956) called the separable given a myth. (McDowell, John, 1994) pressed the conceptual all the way into experience. The inseparability they noticed at the epistemic level is what the cross-entailments force at the structural level. The registers are not sides of description that might come apart. They *are* one act of describing one fact.[^2-6-9-triunity-ch4]

What that one fact is, named, is delivered at [§2.6.10](<2.6.10 Triconditional Identity.md>).

[^2-6-9-triunity-ch4]: The Triunity claim (that the modal, nomological, and ontological readings are one Nature rather than three independent layers) is engaged in Chapter 4. Modal collapse is the worry the Triunity must disarm at the propositional level ([§4.4.9](<4.4.9 Modal Collapse Objection.md>)), Lewis reads modal realism as a three-layer picture ([§4.4.1](<4.4.1 Modal Realism.md>)), Sider's structuralism ([§4.4.7](<4.4.7 Sider's Structuralism.md>)) and structural realism press on what the convergence consists in ([§4.3.9](<4.3.9 Structural Realism.md>)), and Quine's anti-distinction pressure targets the layer-as-reading move ([§4.1.6](<4.1.6 Quinean Modal Skepticism.md>)).

[^2-6-9-thin-loaded-descent-ch4]: Whether the thin Conditions granted to an atemporal ground (mere priority, distinctness, and dependence) descend to the loaded reading (directional succession and causal carrying), the classical-theist and Neoplatonic line, is established at [§2.8.6](<2.8.6 Exclusivity of Nature.md>) in two stages. Its modal core is discharged in-chapter at [§2.8.6](<2.8.6 Exclusivity of Nature.md>) (Exclusivity of Nature, Theorem 7): any candidate necessary ground either instantiates T, S, and Φ in the loaded sense (structure under another description) or forecloses rather than enables any possible state of affairs, a variant of ∅, on owned Chapter-2 machinery (the Triconditional Cross-Entailment [§2.6.7](<2.6.7 Triconditional Cross-Entailment.md>) and the Incoherence of ∅ [§2.7.2](<2.7.2 Incoherence of ∅.md>)). The strongest named formulations are then tested at [§5.2.1](<5.2.1 Divine Simplicity.md>) (Divine Simplicity), [§5.3.2](<5.3.2 Neoplatonism.md>) (Neoplatonism), and [§5.2.2](<5.2.2 Via Negativa.md>) (The Via Negativa).


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← [2.6.8 Ontological Identity](<2.6.8 Ontological Identity.md>) | [2.6.10 Triconditional Identity](<2.6.10 Triconditional Identity.md>) →
