> [!definition]
> **Grounding** · *Definition*
>
> Non-causal dependence: X *grounds* Y when Y holds *because of* X, where the *because* is metaphysical, not causal or temporal.

*Y depends on X* is the converse; *X is metaphysically prior to Y* names priority. This vocabulary is the working language of a recent literature: grounding emerged as a distinct philosophical category in the early 2000s, with Fine, Schaffer, and Rosen as its principal architects. The canonical case is Fine's singleton: the set {Socrates} is grounded in Socrates, not the other way around. Socrates does not exist *because of* his singleton; the singleton exists *because* Socrates does. The dependence runs one way only, and that one-way *because of* is what grounding picks out. P and Q together ground their conjunction; the conjunction does not ground either P or Q. Adjacent operators (*fixes*, *makes the case*) name determination: specifying X is enough to settle Y.

Concrete necessary-foundation accounts (Rasmussen's grounding of contingent existence in a necessary being (Pruss, Alexander R., and Joshua L. Rasmussen, 2018) is the canonical contemporary case) diverge from the Necessity of Nature line of argument at [§5.1.1](<5.1.1 Rasmussen's Foundation Argument.md>), where the engagement runs at full strength. A note on modal-apparatus ancestry: the arguments of Ch 2 that establish □(T∧S∧Φ) deploy the S5 states-of-affairs framework Plantinga develops -(Plantinga, A., 1974), the existential-inversion argument-form Rasmussen employs, and the act/potency derivation Feser develops -(Feser, Edward, 2017). The conclusion they reach is more specific than a necessary being (T∧S∧Φ), and they run without personal-theist commitments at any stage. The argument-form inheritance is real and acknowledged; the stage-divergence is taken up at [§5.1.1](<5.1.1 Rasmussen's Foundation Argument.md>).


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← [1.5.4 Supervenience](<1.5.4 Supervenience.md>) | [1.5.6 Causation](<1.5.6 Causation.md>) →
