Van Hamme distinguishes three classes of necessity: logical-analytic (Class A), modal-structural (Class B), and existential (Class C), and argues that modal logic's jurisdiction stops at Class B. Arguments that ask modal apparatus to certify Class C necessity (that a particular being exists necessarily) cannot get that result without admitting Class B structure, which already does the work the proposed existent was supposed to do. Van Hamme reads the result as a limit on a family of necessary-being arguments; the present argument reads it as a relocation of modal force. What modal logic *can* deliver, Class B (modal-structural necessity, the necessity of frame-conditions any possible world satisfies), is the class T∧S∧Φ occupies. The identification is inclusive rather than exhaustive: Class B may include further frame-conditions the present argument does not develop, but T, S, and Φ are Class B necessities on the structural-minimum reading the present argument develops, since they are the frame-conditions any modally specifiable state of affairs satisfies. (Fritz, Peter; Lo, Tien-Chun; Schmid, Joseph C., 2026) run a structurally distinct reverse-direction modal ontological argument against a necessary-being conclusion, valid in S4 alone, without reliance on the Euclidean Axiom. The relevant comparison is with the fixed-domain modal-stability argument and its Bottleneck defense at §[§2.1.4](<2.1.4 Modal Stability.md>)–2.1.5, not with [§2.1.3](<2.1.3 Modal Constitution.md>)'s non-vacuity lemma. Any claim that an S4-only reverse argument transfers to the present framework must be assessed against those premises rather than attributed to Modal Constitution. These independent lines converge on the negative result: modal logic does not by itself deliver a particular necessary being. The present argument adds the positive complement: what modal logic does deliver is Nature.


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← [2.9.1 Priority Monism](<2.9.1 Priority Monism.md>) | [2.9.3 Total-Theory Comparison](<2.9.3 Total-Theory Comparison.md>) →
