*Structural constraints.* The upstream-prevention thesis, combined with the [§9.10](<9.10 Healthcare.md>) account of mental-health and substance conditions as healthcare-domain conditions, makes civilian first response part of the public floor (mental-health crisis teams, dispatch-redirection protocols, unarmed responders for non-violent calls, mediation services) so arrangements that route the full call volume through armed police as the default first response are precluded, with the specific architecture (CAHOOTS-style standalone units, embedded mental-health responders, hybrid models) open but adequate civilian first response required. Demilitarization is a structural constraint rather than a policy preference, because the boundary with [§9.11](<9.11 Defense.md>) Defense is load-bearing: the two domains require opposite encounter-architectures, military-derived equipment and tactics being designed for time-compression engagement of enemies while enforcement-of-citizens is structurally a time-preservation engagement of fellow participants, so the equipment-and-tactical pipelines that import the wrong architecture (the 1033-program-equivalent transfers, the SWAT-team-as-default-deployment expansion, the militarized-protective-equipment-as-encounter-default pattern) are precluded structurally. Time-preservation tactical doctrine is correspondingly mandatory at the encounter interface, the [§8.4](<8.4 Reasoning.md>) and [§8.9](<8.9 Will.md>) agency derivation making it a structural constraint rather than a tactical preference: training, equipment, dispatch protocols, and use-of-force standards must preserve the citizen's analysis-time, with specific implementations (replacement of the 21-foot rule, weapon-presentation only as residual, explicit time-creation in command-presence training, the PERF *Guiding Principles*) open but the doctrine required to preserve time rather than compress it. For-profit and revenue-extraction policing are precluded on the same structural-extraction logic that precludes for-profit healthcare and for-profit prisons (arrangements where enforcement budgets are substantially funded by fines, asset-forfeiture, court fees, or other revenue extracted at the citizen-encounter interface, the Ferguson-pattern revenue-generation policing being the canonical instance) while the specific budget architectures (general-fund funding; no-revenue-tied funding; civil-asset-forfeiture reform or abolition) remain underdetermined. And accountability architecture is mandatory, the legitimacy of any encounter resting on preserving the agency it is supposed to protect: at institutional scale that requires independent oversight, transparent discipline records, meaningful consequences for misconduct, qualified-immunity reform, and collective-bargaining boundaries on misconduct discipline, with specific architectures open but the institution required to be accountable to the political community it serves.

*Cross-domain couplings.* Enforcement couples to healthcare ([§9.10](<9.10 Healthcare.md>)) at the mental-health-crisis interface, the framework's account of mental-health-and-substance conditions as healthcare-domain conditions coupling the domains directly so that reform of one without the other underperforms. It couples to economy ([§9.7](<9.7 Economy.md>)) and education ([§9.9](<9.9 Education.md>)) at the upstream-prevention interface, since most coercion-events enforcement handles are downstream of conditions the framework's economic and educational commitments address, and reform of enforcement architecture without parallel upstream investment produces smaller effects than reformers anticipate. It couples to defense ([§9.11](<9.11 Defense.md>)) at the demilitarization boundary, which is load-bearing because the two domains require opposite encounter-architectures and defense-industry overcapacity that pressures for domestic-deployment outlets violates the boundary structurally. It couples to justice ([§9.13](<9.13 Justice.md>)) at the prevention/accountability boundary, the two sharing the within-polity-coercion-management function but addressing different temporal moments (enforcement prevents and de-escalates before coercion occurs, justice handles accountability when prevention fails) so they have to be designed together. And it couples to representation ([§9.3](<9.3 Representation.md>)) on the democratic-oversight side, police-union political capture exceeding democratic oversight being one of the structural-extraction patterns the framework most thoroughly derives, with the constraint running through the [§9.3](<9.3 Representation.md>) direction-recognition mechanism so that enforcement reform without representation reform underperforms.

*Bounded field-engagement.* The framework is not abolitionist: enforcement institutions are licensed on the upstream-prevention-of-coercion account, and only the doctrinal and political-economic configurations that produce the structural-extraction and agency-compression patterns the empirical record displays are precluded, which places the position in the field with reform-criminological traditions (PERF, Police Foundation, Center for Policing Equity, Stuntz) and parts from full abolition on the existence of the apparatus: the convergence with abolitionist structural-critique on the diagnosis real, the divergence on the destination following from the framework's account of residual coercion-events that even adequate substrate cannot prevent. Nor is it law-and-order: the framework precludes the political-economic and doctrinal configurations that produce the use-of-force-and-extraction patterns the record displays under law-and-order regimes, its diagnosis converging with reform-criminological scholarship on the inadequacy of punishment-severity-and-aggressive-policing as primary tools. Industry pushback is structurally predicted: police-union resistance to accountability reform, defense-industry resistance to demilitarization, and revenue-dependent municipal resistance to for-profit-policing reform will be the most ferocious resistances in any enforcement reform, on the same logic the [§9.9](<9.9 Education.md>) and [§9.10](<9.10 Healthcare.md>) pushback derivations run, so the transition design has to anticipate and route around it. And the framework respects the difficulty of the work: the structural critique is not that individual officers are bad-faith actors but that doctrine, equipment, training, political economy, and substrate conditions shape outcomes more than individual character does, so its commitments include adequately resourced, trained, and supported officers operating within an accountability architecture that prevents the institution from assigning them work enforcement is not structured to do well: handling mental-health crises with armed-police default, generating municipal revenue at the citizen-encounter interface, or occupying space the political community is obliged to occupy through other means.

These implications are derived under engagement with the contested enforcement-tradition opposition objections [§9.12.1](<9.12.1 What is Disputed.md>) names at premise: police-abolitionism (Davis, *Are Prisons Obsolete?* 2003; Gilmore, *Golden Gulag* 2007; Kaba, *We Do This 'Til We Free Us* 2021), the broken-windows / order-maintenance tradition (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Bratton's NYPD record; Mac Donald), libertarian minimal-state on policing (Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* 1974; Rothbard, *For a New Liberty* 1973), and the anarchist tradition (Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid* 1902; Bakunin, *God and the State* 1882; Graeber, *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology* 2004), which [§9.12.1](<9.12.1 What is Disputed.md>) engages at section length, so that the implications stated here apply under that engagement.

What the framework leaves open is the architecture of civilian first response (CAHOOTS-style standalone, embedded responders, hybrid models, or other designs), the equipment and training-pipeline reform paths, the qualified-immunity reform paths (judicial reinterpretation, statutory reform, full elimination with replacement liability architecture), the union-contract reform paths, the accountability architecture (civilian review boards with specified powers, independent prosecutors for police-misconduct cases, transparent discipline-record systems), the transition paths from current arrangements to compatible alternatives, and the calibration of community-policing, foot-patrol, beat-architecture, and use-of-force-standard reform choices. Where multiple designs satisfy the constraints, the choice belongs to the design literatures, the empirical record, and the recognized direction of the population through [§9.3](<9.3 Representation.md>) (Representation).

Pared to one claim, the [§9.12](<9.12 Enforcement.md>) argument across its five subsections runs: enforcement is the domestic analogue of defense, constitutive infrastructure licensed by the obligation to protect participants from coercion by other participants, and structurally distorted by the same for-profit-extraction and political-economic-capture patterns that distort defense at the international register. The confirmation record shows that doctrine, political economy, and upstream-substrate conditions govern use-of-force and community-trust outcomes far more strongly than officer character does, which is precisely what the framework predicts when the institution's primary variables are structural rather than individual. The institutional-design implications follow as a single package: upstream investment, time-preservation tactical doctrine, civilian-first-response infrastructure, demilitarization, and accountability architecture are not separate reform preferences but one structural obligation derived from the same account of what the institution exists to do.


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← [9.12.4 What is Confirmed](<9.12.4 What is Confirmed.md>) | [9.13 Justice](<9.13 Justice.md>) →
