The framework's predictions in [§9.12.3](<9.12.3 What is Predicted.md>) are gauged against the empirical and theoretical literature on enforcement-system performance, with comparative cross-national data where available.

*First.* Doctrinal orientation drives use-of-force outcomes. The Police Executive Research Forum's *Guiding Principles on Use of Force* (2016) and the empirical evaluations of ICAT (Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics) training (Engel, McManus, and Herold 2020 meta-analysis on de-escalation training outcomes; the Louisville Metro Police Department randomized evaluation, *Criminology and Public Policy*) register the doctrinal-orientation effect at department scale. Departments adopting de-escalation-and-time-preservation doctrines (Camden, NJ post-2013; Louisville, KY post-2015 reforms; Las Vegas Metro post-2012 use-of-force review reforms) record use-of-force reductions in the 30–50% range without corresponding crime increases. The Stinson police-shooting database (Bowling Green State University) and the Mapping Police Violence dataset supply the long time-series for doctrinal-effect comparison. The prediction is empirically supported across multiple reform jurisdictions.

*Second.* Upstream-conditions adequacy lowers policing demand. The empirical literature on community-level policing-demand correlates documents the upstream-investment effect. Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) on collective efficacy; Sharkey, Torrats-Espinosa, and Takyar (2017) on the concentrated-poverty-to-policing-demand pathway; the Vera Institute's systematic work on policing-demand drivers. Cross-national comparison surfaces the structural pattern: countries with adequate upstream conditions (Nordic countries, Germany, Netherlands, Japan) display lower policing demand and better outcomes on the demand, use-of-force, trust, and cost metrics tracked in the comparative record. The framework's prediction is empirically confirmed at both within-country and cross-country scales.

*Third.* Civilian-first-response outperforms armed-police response for mental-health crises. The Eugene, Oregon CAHOOTS program (Crisis Assistance Helping Out On The Streets), operating since 1989, charts the civilian-first-response outperformance directly: CAHOOTS handles approximately 17–20% of total police call volume at operating cost about 2% of police budget, with a few hundred backup-request events out of roughly 24,000 annual calls (White Bird Clinic operational reports). The Denver STAR (Support Team Assistance Response) program, the New York City B-HEARD program, and the Albuquerque Community Safety Department implementations record the same pattern at varying scales. The Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training literature (Watson and Fulambarker 2012; Compton et al. 2014) traces the within-department version of the same effect. The Glasgow Violence Reduction Unit, founded 2005, treats violence as a public-health problem and documents 50%+ reductions in violent-crime rates over the program's first decade through upstream-substrate investment combined with targeted intervention. The prediction is broadly confirmed across multiple natural experiments.

*Fourth.* Police-union capture resists accountability reform. The empirical literature on police-union political weight (Walker 2008 on early-warning-system resistance; Rushin 2017 on collective-bargaining-and-police-misconduct in *Duke Law Journal*; DeAngelis 2019) surfaces the structural-extraction pattern at scale. The Marshall Project's investigations into arbitration-driven reinstatement of terminated officers, and the empirical literature on contract-protected discipline-record sealing (Stephens, Scrivner and Cambareri 2018), confirm the prediction. The 2020-21 reform-resistance pattern across major US cities (Chicago, Minneapolis, Portland) documents the union-driven structural friction the framework's prediction names. Forman's *Locking Up Our Own* (2017) documents the historical pattern at the broader political-economic register.

*Fifth.* Domestic militarization tracks defense-industry overcapacity. The US Department of Defense 1033 Program, transferring military-grade equipment to local police departments since 1997 with significant expansion post-2001, provides the empirical record at scale. Balko's *Rise of the Warrior Cop* (2013) maps the doctrinal and equipment transfer in detail. The ACLU's *War Comes Home* (2014) and the empirical literature on SWAT-team deployment expansion (Kraska 2007 on SWAT call-out rates: from a few hundred per year nationally in the 1970s to 50,000+ by the 2000s) confirm the prediction. The prediction couples to [§9.11](<9.11 Defense.md>) Defense at the boundary the framework derives.

*Sixth.* For-profit and revenue-generation policing produces extraction patterns. The US Department of Justice 2015 Ferguson Report charts the revenue-generation-policing pattern in detail: the city's reliance on traffic-stop fines and court fees produced a structural-extraction pattern at the citizen-encounter interface, with disproportionate impact on Black residents. The empirical literature on civil-asset-forfeiture (Sallah, O'Harrow and Rich 2014 *Washington Post* series; the Institute for Justice's *Policing for Profit* reports across multiple editions) traces the structural pattern at scale. The empirical record on bail-bond industry political-economy and on private-probation industry extraction (Human Rights Watch *Profiting from Probation* 2014) confirms the broader prediction. Where enforcement budgets depend on extraction at the citizen-encounter interface, the framework's prediction tracks the empirical record directly.

*Seventh.* Time-pressure tactical doctrine produces worse outcomes. The cross-national comparison provides the strongest confirmation. Countries where police are unarmed by default (UK, Norway, Iceland, New Zealand) operate with police-shooting rates orders of magnitude below the US rate. UK police fired weapons 10 times in 2016 with 5 fatalities (Home Office statistics); Norwegian police fired weapons 2 times in the same year with 0 fatalities (Politidirektoratet annual reports); US police killed approximately 1,000 people in the same year (Mapping Police Violence; Stinson dataset). Iceland recorded its first police killing in its modern history in 2013. The Japanese koban system documents an alternative time-preservation architecture at scale: roughly 6,000 neighborhood police boxes operating on community-relationship-and-presence rather than rapid-response tactical doctrine, with national homicide rates among the lowest globally (UNODC). The PERF *Guiding Principles on Use of Force* (2016) and the empirical work on shoot/don't-shoot decision research document the time-pressure-degradation effect at the within-department register. The prediction is empirically confirmed across multiple cross-national comparisons.

*Eighth.* Composite outperformance of upstream-conditions-plus-doctrine arrangements. The cross-national comparison provides the strongest evidence for the composite prediction. Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland) display: lower violent-crime rates than the US by factors of 4–10x (UNODC homicide statistics); use-of-force rates orders of magnitude below US rates; community-trust metrics consistently above 70% (Eurobarometer; OECD Better Life Index); and per-capita policing costs comparable to or lower than US per-capita costs despite higher per-officer wages. Germany and the Netherlands display similar patterns at slightly larger population scales. Japan's koban system provides a non-Western confirmation of the same composite pattern.

The Camden, New Jersey 2013 disbandment-and-rebuild provides the within-US confirmation. The original Camden Police Department was disbanded in 2013 amid documented patterns of the framework's predictions: high use-of-force, low community trust, structural budget extraction. The rebuilt Camden County Police Department adopted a community-policing-and-de-escalation doctrine, expanded foot patrols, restructured training around time-preservation tactics, and saw violent-crime rates fall approximately 40% over the next several years while complaints fell sharply (Maciag 2017 *Governing*; the Center for Policing Equity case study). The Camden case is the within-country empirical confirmation that the composite prediction holds at the reform-implementation scale, not only at cross-national comparison scale.

*On theoretical convergences.* The framework converges on conclusions independently reached in: public-health approaches to violence (Krug et al. 2002 WHO *World Report on Violence and Health*; Slutkin's Cure Violence model); abolitionist scholarship's structural critique of policing (Vitale 2017 *The End of Policing*; Kaba 2021 *We Do This 'Til We Free Us*), read as identifying the structural-extraction patterns the framework derives without committing to the abolitionist destination; reform-oriented police scholarship (Stoughton, Noble and Alpert 2020 *Evaluating Police Uses of Force*); the Stuntz *Collapse of American Criminal Justice* (2011) tradition; and the Forman *Locking Up Our Own* (2017) reframing of the historical record. The convergence from public-health, abolitionist-critical, reform-criminological, and historical premises supports the robustness of the conclusions, even where the framework's destination differs from each.

*What does not confirm the framework.* Strong-form law-and-order accounts predict that crime rates track punishment-severity and police aggressiveness more than they track upstream-substrate investment; the cross-national empirical record refuses this prediction across multiple metrics. Strong-form full-abolitionist accounts predict that any enforcement institution produces structurally worse outcomes than absence; the framework licenses upstream-prevention-oriented institutions and parts from full abolition on the existence of those institutions, with the empirical record on community-violence-without-protective-institutions supporting the framework's intermediate position. Strong-form character-based accounts of policing outcomes (*a few bad apples*; *better recruitment fixes everything*) predict that doctrinal and structural variables matter less than officer-individual variables; the empirical literature on doctrinal-orientation effects refuses this prediction. The confirmations stated in this subsection are made under engagement with the contested enforcement-tradition opposition objections [§9.12.1](<9.12.1 What is Disputed.md>) names at premise: police-abolitionism (Davis, *Are Prisons Obsolete?* 2003; Gilmore, *Golden Gulag* 2007; Kaba, *We Do This 'Til We Free Us* 2021), the broken-windows / order-maintenance tradition (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Bratton's NYPD record; Mac Donald), libertarian minimal-state on policing (Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* 1974; Rothbard, *For a New Liberty* 1973), and the anarchist tradition (Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid* 1902; Bakunin, *God and the State* 1882; Graeber, *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology* 2004). Those traditions are engaged at section length in [§9.12.1](<9.12.1 What is Disputed.md>), and the confirmation record stated here applies under that engagement.


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← [9.12.3 What is Predicted](<9.12.3 What is Predicted.md>) | [9.12.5 What is Concluded](<9.12.5 What is Concluded.md>) →
