*Structural constraints.* Rights-architecture is constitutive infrastructure on the same logic that the legal system, the public-health system, and the public-education system are, so rights protection that operates only at the formal-non-interference register without grounding in the underlying conditions of life and subsistence violates the structural constraint at the design level; specific architectures (constitutional enshrinement, statutory protection, international-treaty articulation, common-law development) are underdetermined, but the requirement that some adequate rights-architecture grounded in those conditions exist holds. On the same derivation, rights-architectures that treat negative and positive rights as exhaustive categories competing for institutional priority are precluded, since the substantive content of the negative rights (life, liberty, participation) requires the substantive content of the positive rights (subsistence, healthcare, education) for its actual exercise; the distinction may be drawn for analytic, jurisprudential, or institutional purposes, but not used to deprioritize the grounding the negative rights themselves require. The right to life, correspondingly, cannot be deployed against the rights-bearer's own substantive autonomy: not when wellness has become irretrievable, not when bodily autonomy is at stake in reproductive contexts, and not when the rights-bearer's own assessment of their conditions is the data the architecture exists to protect; deployment of the legal form of the right against the *bios* it was structured to protect is precluded, and the end-of-life-autonomy and reproductive-autonomy cases are taken up at [§9.10](<9.10 Healthcare.md>) on this derivation. And because the participation-condition reading yields equal-protection-and-full-accommodation as structural requirements rather than supplementary commitments, discrimination, exclusion, and inadequate accommodation count as violations of the participation conditions the architecture maintains, with the specific accommodation and equal-protection designs underdetermined but the requirement of actual participation-conditions-equal-across-categories holding.

*Cross-domain couplings.* The derivation that rights articulate participation conditions, and that the right to life requires subsistence, couples [§9.1](<9.1 Rights.md>) to every domain that delivers subsistence-conditions: [§9.7](<9.7 Economy.md>) Economy (adequate living cost; floor income), [§9.10](<9.10 Healthcare.md>) Healthcare (universal access to the healthcare floor), [§9.9](<9.9 Education.md>) Education (educational substrate), [§9.6](<9.6 Agriculture.md>) Agriculture (food-system adequacy), and [§9.5](<9.5 Environment.md>) Environment (sustained substrate across the temporal horizon). Rights protection without parallel subsistence delivery is precluded, and the rights-architecture and the subsistence-delivery architecture have to be designed together. Rights also couple to representation, justice, and enforcement at distinct interfaces: the participation-condition reading makes representation ([§9.3](<9.3 Representation.md>)) the channel through which rights-bearers recognize the direction of the political community, so that representation reform without rights-grounding produces formal channels without substantive direction-setting while rights-architecture without representation produces nominal protections without operational direction; they couple to justice ([§9.13](<9.13 Justice.md>)) at the enforcement interface, where a justice system that does not enforce the rights architecture violates the constraint; and they couple to enforcement ([§9.12](<9.12 Enforcement.md>)) at the rights-protection-orientation interface, where enforcement doctrine that does not run on rights-protection orientation violates the derived couplings.

*Field-engagement.* The participation-condition reading converges substantively with the capabilities approach (Sen, Nussbaum) while parting from specific Nussbaumian commitments where the derivation does not license them, and it supports the substantive direction of socioeconomic-rights constitutionalization (South African Constitutional Court jurisprudence, Indian Supreme Court socioeconomic-rights jurisprudence, the Latin American constitutional-social-rights tradition) while leaving the architecture underdetermined: common-law jurisdictions can deliver the grounding through statutory and judicial development, civil-law jurisdictions through constitutional enshrinement, and mixed jurisdictions through the international-treaty channel via ICESCR ratification and incorporation, the framework precluding only the arrangement that delivers no such grounding through any channel.

What the framework leaves open is the specific architecture of rights-protection (constitutional, statutory, international-treaty, common-law), the specific list of participation-condition-grounded rights beyond the requirement that the derived participation conditions be protected, the specific enforcement architecture (judicial review with what powers; international human-rights mechanisms; legislative-protection designs), the specific accommodation architectures across protected categories, the calibration of negative-and-positive rights jurisprudence within frameworks that articulate both, and the transition path from current configurations to framework-compatible alternatives in any given jurisdiction. Where multiple designs satisfy the constraints, the framework leaves the choice to the design literatures, the empirical record, and the recognized direction of the population through [§9.3](<9.3 Representation.md>) (Representation); the chapter's subsequent sections (§[§9.2](<9.2 Belonging.md>)–9.13) develop the domain-specific commitments that take this rights-foundation as input, while the convergence of those twelve domains at the chapter scale is taken up at [§9.14](<9.14 Convergence.md>) and framework installation at [§9.15](<9.15 Installation.md>).

The [§9.1](<9.1 Rights.md>) derivation across the five subsections reduces to one thesis: rights are participation conditions, and the structural commitment runs simultaneously through the formal-legal channel (rights-architecture grounding life and subsistence) and the material channel (delivery of the conditions the formal rights require for actual exercise). The confirmation record shows that the strongest rights-protection traditions (socioeconomic constitutionalism, the capabilities approach, international human-rights law) converge on the same structural requirement from different starting points. Rights-architecture without floor delivery, or floor delivery without rights-architecture, leaves the structural commitment half-executed.


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← [9.1.4 What is Confirmed](<9.1.4 What is Confirmed.md>) | [9.2 Belonging](<9.2 Belonging.md>) →
