The framework's predictions in [§9.5.3](<9.5.3 What is Predicted.md>) are checked against the empirical and theoretical literature on environmental-policy performance.

*First.* Climate-action delay tracks fossil-fuel-industry extraction. Oreskes and Conway (2010) trace the empirical pattern of fossil-fuel-industry-funded climate-science denial across decades. Supran and Oreskes (2017, 2021) surface ExxonMobil's internal climate-science awareness and contradictory public communications at the firm level. Brulle (2014) and Farrell (2016) map the foundation-funded counter-movement network through which industry-funded delay was institutionalized. The empirical record confirms the prediction across the entire post-1980 period.

*Second.* Intergenerational extraction patterns are systematically larger. The IPCC scientific consensus (IPCC 2014, 2021, 2023) maps the climate-change extraction pattern at the intergenerational scale. Stern (2007) and the subsequent climate-economics literature (Nordhaus 2017; Stern 2015) trace the cost-shifting from current to future generations that the prediction names. The biodiversity-loss empirical record (IPBES 2019; WWF 2022) shows the same pattern at the biosphere scale. The prediction holds across multiple intergenerational extraction patterns simultaneously.

*Third.* Environmental externalities track structural-extraction patterns. Pigou (1920; *The Economics of Welfare*) provides the foundational theoretical account of externalities, and the empirical literature on uninternalized environmental externalities across industries shows the structural pattern. Coase (1960) offers an alternative: externality-internalization through collective management, or through property rights with transaction-cost reduction. The empirical record on which approaches have worked in which contexts confirms that the framework's structural-internalization requirement holds across both.

*Fourth.* Tragedy-of-the-commons patterns and Ostrom's correction. Hardin (1968) provides the foundational tragedy-of-the-commons account. Ostrom (1990) provides the empirical correction. Effective collective-management institutions exist in many real-world cases, and pure-Hardin pessimism overestimates the inevitability. The framework's prediction is that tragedy-of-the-commons holds absent management institutions, but that effective management institutions exist empirically. Ostrom's literature documents exactly that, and the framework converges on her empirical position.

*Fifth.* Renewable adoption tracks fossil-fuel-industry political weight. The comparative-jurisdictions empirical literature on renewable-energy adoption documents the pattern: jurisdictions with weaker fossil-fuel political weight (most of Western Europe; California; some northeastern US states) adopted renewables faster than jurisdictions with stronger fossil-fuel weight (Texas, West Virginia, several major fossil-fuel-producing nations) controlling for resource availability. The cost-curve literature on renewable-energy LCOE (IRENA 2023; Lazard 2023) documents that the cost differential has favored renewables for years in most jurisdictions; adoption-rate variation tracks political-economy more than economics.

*Sixth.* Biodiversity loss tracks extraction pressure on habitat. The empirical literature on biodiversity-loss drivers (IPBES 2019; Pimm et al. 2014; Ceballos et al. 2015) shows that habitat loss (driven by agricultural expansion, urbanization, and resource extraction) is the dominant cause of biodiversity loss, exceeding direct hunting or collection in most contexts. The signal tracks extraction pressure rather than human-population variables alone, as predicted.

*Seventh.* The technology condition is the test case. The empirical record on this prediction is being written in real time at the date of the manuscript. Climate-mitigation technology deployment, biodiversity-restoration technology, ecosystem-management technology, and the broader question of whether technological civilization can maintain the conditions it depends on are all in active empirical development. The framework's prediction status will be updated as the empirical record accumulates. The technology fork developed through [§8.11](<8.11 Technology.md>) and specified in [§9.5.3](<9.5.3 What is Predicted.md>) is the fork [§9.5](<9.5 Environment.md>) is now operating on; the species-level outcome is what's being tested.

*Eighth.* Indigenous and traditional governance traditions outperform. The empirical literature on Indigenous land-management outcomes (Garnett et al. 2018 on Indigenous lands containing the majority of remaining biodiversity; Fa et al. 2020 on Indigenous-stewarded lands and biodiversity outcomes) shows the long-run-outcome pattern. Ostrom's commons literature confirms the broader convergence. The prediction holds across multiple comparison categories.

*On theoretical convergences.* The framework converges on conclusions independently reached in: ecological economics (Daly 1977; Costanza et al. 1997), Indigenous environmental philosophy (Kimmerer 2013; LaDuke 1999; Whyte 2018), capabilities-approach environmental ethics (Nussbaum 2006, ch. 6), commons-governance scholarship (Ostrom 1990; Bollier 2014), Earth-system science (the Planetary Boundaries framework, Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2015), deep-ecology and ecocentric ethics traditions, and Pigovian–Coasean externality-economics. The convergence from premises as diverse as Indigenous philosophy and welfare-theoretic externality economics is unusually broad and supports the robustness of the conclusions.

*What does not confirm the framework.* Strong-form market-only environmental accounts (the cornucopian tradition; Simon 1981 at strongest reading) predict that market mechanisms internalize environmental costs without regulatory institutions; the empirical record on uninternalized externalities refuses the prediction. Strong-form pure-Hardin pessimism predicts that commons cannot be managed; Ostrom's literature refuses the prediction. Strong-form deep-ecology positions that preclude human use of environmental resources entirely predict policy outcomes the framework does not endorse; the framework licenses sustainable use within the constraints, not preclusion of use. Strong-form geoengineering-optimism that treats technological climate intervention as a substitute for emissions reduction predicts policy paths the framework does not endorse; the framework treats technological options as supplements to structural reform, not substitutes for it. The confirmations stated in this subsection are made under engagement with the contested environmental-policy traditions [§9.5.1](<9.5.1 What is Disputed.md>) names at premise: free-market environmentalism (Coase 1960; Anderson and Leal 1991), the deep-ecology tradition (Næss 1973; Devall and Sessions 1985), and the cost-benefit / prioritization tradition (Nordhaus 2013; Lomborg 2001). Those traditions are engaged at section length in [§9.5.1](<9.5.1 What is Disputed.md>), and the confirmation record stated here applies under that engagement.


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← [9.5.3 What is Predicted](<9.5.3 What is Predicted.md>) | [9.5.5 What is Concluded](<9.5.5 What is Concluded.md>) →
