Two related but distinct lines defend strong necessitarian theses. Della Rocca -(Della Rocca, Michael, 2010); -(Della Rocca, Michael, 2020) revives the Principle of Sufficient Reason and argues that PSR commits its proponent to the necessity of all states of affairs; the conclusion is presented as a consequence of taking PSR seriously rather than as an independently motivated necessitarian thesis. Karofsky's *A Case for Necessitarianism* -(Karofsky, Amy, 2021) defends the stronger thesis directly: *everything* is necessary, with no contingency anywhere in the modal field. The two lines converge on overlapping conclusions but proceed differently: Della Rocca through PSR-revival, Karofsky through direct necessitarian argument. The present argument does not endorse this stronger thesis ([§2.8.4](<2.8.4 Necessity Precedes Contingency.md>), *Necessity Precedes Contingency*); the modal floor is necessary, the modal contents are not. But the necessitarian's case leaves the present argument's narrower claim secure from both directions. If the necessitarian is right that everything is necessary, then *a fortiori* the structural Conditions of Nature are necessary, and the present argument's conclusion is contained in the necessitarian's stronger one. If the necessitarian is wrong about modal contents, the case for the structural Conditions' necessity remains untouched, because the present argument never required global necessity to begin with. Della Rocca and Karofsky press from one direction; the present argument fills in the structural specification their general thesis leaves open.


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← [2.9.3 Total-Theory Comparison](<2.9.3 Total-Theory Comparison.md>) | [2.9.5 Three Formal Logics](<2.9.5 Three Formal Logics.md>) →
