*Structural constraints.* The framework grounds property in collective-investment output that an individual has stewardship over, not in a Lockean natural right the political community merely respects, and that single premise has two practical consequences: the wrongness of vandalism is independent of the owner's class, because the violated relation is the community's stewardship logic rather than the owner's personal pre-political claim; and stewardship beyond proportionate contribution is structurally suspect, because it begins to look like privatization of infrastructure-output rather than legitimate holding. The harm-to-community framing carries a natural correlate: if the harm of property crime is partly to the political community and not only to the individual owner, restitution is partly owed to the community, so the framework endorses restitution-incorporating sentencing structures (community service, contribution-to-public-good, restorative-justice conferences with victim-and-community participation) at the structural level rather than as a contingent add-on, which makes pure-incarceration sentences without restitution components structurally incomplete on the framework's terms. And the justice infrastructure itself (courts, prisons, police, public defenders, prosecutors) is collective-investment output, so the framework precludes for-profit occupation of justice-system functions on the same logic that precludes for-profit occupation of the healthcare sufficiency floor: private prisons, for-profit probation, cash-bail-as-revenue, and civil-asset-forfeiture-as-funding each substitute profit-extraction at the point of coercive system contact for the community's obligation to operate justice as collective-investment output.

*Cross-domain couplings.* Justice runs upstream into healthcare, education, and economy: the pattern [§9.13.4](<9.13.4 What is Confirmed.md>) documented (that upstream-justice investment dominates downstream-justice investment on every measurable margin) is not a contingent fact about current programs but a structural pattern derivable from the upstream-conditions account of survival crimes, mental-health crises, and addiction-related criminalization, so justice cannot be designed as a stand-alone domain and any design that ignores the dependence will systematically underperform. The healthcare-justice routing follows: mental-health and substance-related conditions belong in the healthcare domain ([§9.10](<9.10 Healthcare.md>)) rather than the justice domain, routing them through justice producing measurable underperformance on every relevant metric, with the routing constraint derived at the structural level and the exact line between health-domain and justice-domain response left to the implementation literatures. The education-justice routing follows likewise: educational under-investment in particular populations correlates strongly with their downstream criminalization, and the framework derives the correlation as causal through the developed-capacities account in [§9.9](<9.9 Education.md>) (capacities the community presupposes participants to have, when underdeveloped, make survival behaviors and mutual-recognition-failure behaviors more likely) so investing in education upstream is a justice-domain intervention by structural derivation, not merely by empirical convenience.

*Field-engagement.* The wrongness of property crime and the wrongness of structural extraction are symmetric, both following from the same logic at the same time, so there is no basis here for class-resentment ethics in either direction (not toward the wealthy through vandalism, not toward the poor through punitive criminalization) and that no-class-warfare property holds across [§9.7](<9.7 Economy.md>) (Economy) and [§9.13](<9.13 Justice.md>) (Justice), letting the argument speak across the political spectrum without becoming ammunition for one side. The framework's conclusions on restitution and the upstream-justice coupling converge with restorative-justice scholarship (Zehr 1990; Braithwaite 1989; Sullivan and Tifft 2001) but ground it differently: where that scholarship typically grounds its claims in community values, indigenous justice traditions, or the outcomes record, the framework grounds the same conclusions in the structural logic of political communities ([§8.12](<8.12 Morality.md>) mutual recognition applied at the political register), and the convergence-from-different-grounds is the kind of cross-tradition support that makes the conclusions robust, the framework claiming originality only in the grounding, not the conclusions. And the framework's claims about justice-system extraction apply symmetrically to institutional actors (private-prison companies, for-profit-probation operators, civil-asset-forfeiture beneficiaries) and individual actors (corruption inside justice institutions, gaming the system, perjury): as in [§9.7](<9.7 Economy.md>), the argument against private-prison capture is not against any particular operator personally but against the structurally extractive position the for-profit-justice industry occupies, whatever the personal qualities of the people involved.

These implications are derived under engagement with the contested punishment-theory opposition traditions [§9.13.1](<9.13.1 What is Disputed.md>) names at premise: retributivism (Kant, *Doctrine of Right* 1797, §49; Moore, *Placing Blame* 1997; Duff, *Punishment, Communication, and Community* 2001), abolitionism (Davis, *Are Prisons Obsolete?* 2003; Gilmore, *Golden Gulag* 2007; Kaba, *We Do This 'Til We Free Us* 2021), and restorative-maximalism (Zehr, *Changing Lenses* 1990; Braithwaite, *Crime, Shame and Reintegration* 1989), which [§9.13.1](<9.13.1 What is Disputed.md>) engages at section length, so that the implications stated here apply under that engagement.

What the framework leaves open is restorative-versus-retributive design at the level of detail, the sentencing structures (including the calibration of incarceration, supervision, and restitution components), the carceral-versus-decarceral implementation (pure incarceration without restitution and for-profit occupation of justice functions are precluded, but the implementation literature still has room to work), the line between cases routed to healthcare-domain and justice-domain response, the restitution-incorporating sentencing structures (community-service requirements, contribution-to-public-good frameworks, victim-offender dialogue protocols), and the reform paths for justice-system institutions currently captured by for-profit operators or extractive funding. Where multiple designs satisfy the constraints, the choice belongs to the design literatures, the empirical record, and the recognized direction of the population through [§9.3](<9.3 Representation.md>) (Representation).

Distilled to one thesis, the [§9.13](<9.13 Justice.md>) argument across its five subsections holds: the justice system is constitutive infrastructure whose legitimacy rests on operating as collective-investment output, and whose effectiveness is structurally upstream-dependent in ways that make justice reform impossible to execute from within the justice system alone. The confirmation record shows that jurisdictions substantially investing in upstream conditions tend to outperform incarceration-first jurisdictions on the metrics reviewed here, including incarceration rates, use-of-force rates, and community-trust measures. The institutional-design implications are therefore nested: the most powerful justice intervention is the one that never reaches the justice system at all, which means that justice reform is the downstream face of the framework's full infrastructure agenda.


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← [9.13.4 What is Confirmed](<9.13.4 What is Confirmed.md>) | [9.14 Convergence](<9.14 Convergence.md>) →
