The modal ontological argument turns on the S5 transfer from possible necessity to necessity: ◇□P → □P. Within the present account, that transfer follows from the fixed global domain W of real possibilities. It does not follow merely because an attempted rejection linguistically presupposes the framework.

Like the Euclidean principle before it ([§2.1.4](<2.1.4 Modal Stability.md>)), the transfer is schematic. Grant that a proposition is necessary at some member of W. Because every world evaluates necessity over the same W, the proposition is necessary at every member: ◇□P → □P. The inference does not turn on whose proposition P is.

A critic may reject this account only by offering a different semantics of real possibility — one on which necessity is evaluated over genuinely different global domains rather than over W. Merely using modal language to deny S5 does not refute the fixed-domain analysis, but neither does it make denial incoherent by itself. It states a competing modal theory that Chapter 4 evaluates in detail.

The theist is therefore bound if the fixed-domain account is accepted, and the modal ontological argument itself supplies a particularly clear instance: ◇□G → □G. Whether that transfer delivers a theistic conclusion, and what it costs to resist it, is not adjudicated here; the full engagement with Plantinga's argument belongs to Chapter 5 ([§5.1.7](<5.1.7 Modal Ontological Argument.md>)).

*What inverts.* The move the tradition reserved for crowning a necessary being is a structural consequence of global real possibility. It binds every claim evaluated within W, the theist included; it is not a verdict directed against any claimant.


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← [2.1.8 Candidate-Ground Convergence](<2.1.8 Candidate-Ground Convergence.md>) | [2.1.10 Necessary Possibility](<2.1.10 Necessary Possibility.md>) →
