For enforcement to obtain at the scale of a political community whose protective obligation against internal coercion runs alongside its agency-preservation obligation toward every participant the institution encounters (articulating the institutional conditions under which enforcement discharges the [§9.1](<9.1 Rights.md>) protective obligation without becoming the agency-compressing / extraction-at-the-encounter failure mode the framework derives against) the framework sets down a structural-necessity inventory specific to enforcement as constitutive infrastructure. Each is needed and none stands in for another; what enforcement architecture has to deliver to count as enforcement architecture rather than as a militarized revenue-generating apparatus operating under inverted incentives is the entire conjunction, not any subset.

*Upstream-prevention preconditions hold across [§9.7](<9.7 Economy.md>) / [§9.9](<9.9 Education.md>) / [§9.10](<9.10 Healthcare.md>) / [§9.3](<9.3 Representation.md>) / [§9.1](<9.1 Rights.md>).* Most coercion-events within the political community are downstream of failures the chapter already addresses in earlier domains: untreated mental illness and substance disorder ([§9.10](<9.10 Healthcare.md>)), poverty and material precarity ([§9.7](<9.7 Economy.md>) and [§9.10](<9.10 Healthcare.md>) jointly), educational gaps and under-formation of capacity ([§9.9](<9.9 Education.md>)), and the breakdown of the public channels that let disputes resolve before they become physical ([§9.3](<9.3 Representation.md>), [§9.1](<9.1 Rights.md>)). Adequate upstream investment in those domains drains the upstream sources of internal coercion. The condition runs that enforcement depends on those investments as preconditions, not as separate concerns; the residual extreme cases that adequate prevention cannot eliminate are what the institution handles. Where the upstream domains are systematically under-invested, enforcement is overloaded, and the overload itself produces the dysfunctions the empirical record displays (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; Sharkey, Torrats-Espinosa, and Takyar 2017; Stuntz 2011; Forman 2017).

*Rights-protection inversion at the encounter is binding.* Enforcement exists for the third parties whose rights the encounter is protecting; the enforcement-target is not the institution's adversary. A speed-limit stop is not punitive toward the speeder; it is protective of every other driver's right to navigate the road without elevated risk. The enforcement-target remains a participant in the political community throughout the encounter even when their behavior has produced the encounter. The inversion runs the same direction as the [§9.9](<9.9 Education.md>) Education inversion (the student is whom the system forms, not the credential-sorting target) and the [§9.10](<9.10 Healthcare.md>) Healthcare inversion (the patient is whom the system is for, not the cost-center). The framework precludes institutional architectures that operate the enforcement-target as adversary by default.

*Time-preservation tactical doctrine is mandatory at the encounter level ([§8.4](<8.4 Reasoning.md>) and [§8.9](<8.9 Will.md>) derivation).* The [§8.4](<8.4 Reasoning.md>) and [§8.9](<8.9 Will.md>) agency derivation establishes that freedom of will is constituted by the analysis of possibility-space and that analysis-depth scales with available time. Apply this to an enforcement encounter, where the citizen is about to make decisions (comply, explain, move, speak) under conditions where the wrong decision can cost them their liberty or their life: the institution must preserve the time-window for possibility-space analysis. De-escalation is the time-preservation requirement applied to coercion-prevention encounters, not a soft-policy preference. Rapid escalation is appropriate where an active threat is already underway (a drawn weapon, an in-progress assault, an immediate danger to life); the condition precludes the import of those tactics as default posture for routine encounters (traffic stops, welfare checks, mental-health calls). Training architectures, equipment choices, dispatch protocols, and use-of-force standards must preserve citizen analysis-time. Specific implementations (replacement of the 21-foot rule; weapon-presentation only as residual; explicit time-creation in command-presence training; the PERF *Guiding Principles*) are underdetermined within the constraint.

*Civilian first-response routing for mental-health, substance, and non-violent crises is structural.* Mental-health and substance-related conditions are healthcare-domain conditions whatever their downstream behavioral manifestations ([§9.10](<9.10 Healthcare.md>)). Routing such crises through armed-police default first response produces worse aggregate outcomes than routing them through civilian first-response services (Watson and Fulambarker 2012; Compton et al. 2014; the CAHOOTS operational record from 1989 onward; the Denver STAR and Albuquerque Community Safety Department evaluations). The condition runs that civilian first response (mobile crisis teams, dispatch-redirection protocols, unarmed responders for non-violent calls, mediation services) has to exist as shared infrastructure. Specific architectures (CAHOOTS-style standalone units; embedded mental-health responders within department dispatch; hybrid models; community-safety departments at municipal scale) are underdetermined within the constraint.

*Demilitarization boundary with [§9.11](<9.11 Defense.md>) Defense is load-bearing.* Defense and enforcement face different threat-sources and require opposite encounter-architectures. Military-derived equipment, weapons, vehicles, and tactics are designed for time-compression engagement of enemies; enforcement-of-citizens is structurally a time-preservation engagement of fellow participants in the political community. Equipment-and-tactical pipelines from defense to domestic policing that import the wrong encounter-architecture (the 1033-program-equivalent transfer pipelines; the SWAT-team-as-default-deployment expansion; the militarized-protective-equipment-as-encounter-default pattern) violate the condition structurally. The condition couples [§9.12](<9.12 Enforcement.md>) to [§9.11](<9.11 Defense.md>) at the boundary the framework derives.

*For-profit and revenue-extraction policing are structurally precluded.* Where enforcement budgets depend substantially on fines, asset-forfeiture, court fees, or other revenue extracted at the citizen-encounter interface, the arrangement produces extraction-from-vulnerability at the encounter interface, on the same logic that for-profit healthcare extracts at the constitutive-vulnerability interface. The Ferguson-pattern revenue-generation policing is precluded structurally. The bail-bond industry's political economy, the private-probation industry's extraction pattern, and the civil-asset-forfeiture programs that route revenue to the seizing department are precluded as configurations. Specific budget architectures (general-fund funding; no-revenue-tied funding; civil-asset-forfeiture reform or abolition) are underdetermined; the structural preclusion holds.

*Accountability architecture is mandatory, and immunity from consequence is structurally precluded.* The legitimacy of any encounter rests on preserving the agency the encounter is supposed to protect, and that legitimacy cannot survive an institution whose agents are exempt from consequence for the harms they impose. The officer is a participant in the political community bound by the same governing principle as everyone else the chapter addresses: possibility is maximized only up to the point at which it does not unjustifiably infringe on others ([§9.1](<9.1 Rights.md>)). An immunity doctrine that shields an officer from consequence for conduct overshooting what the officer's function or the situation warranted grants that officer a domain of unbounded possibility exercised on another person without consequence — the precise asymmetric substitution, one party's maximum possibility purchased at the expense of another's, that the chapter derives against throughout. Qualified immunity in its consequence-shielding form is therefore precluded structurally, on the same footing as for-profit revenue-extraction policing, rather than left open as a reformable feature: an officer who exceeds justified force answers for it as any other participant would. At institutional scale the requirement further runs through independent oversight, transparent discipline records, meaningful consequences for misconduct, and collective-bargaining boundaries on misconduct discipline that prevent arbitration-driven reinstatement of terminated officers. The Police Executive Research Forum's reform recommendations, the Center for Policing Equity's structural-accountability work, and the broader reform-criminological literature converge on the operational form of the requirement. What remains underdetermined is the mechanism through which non-immunity is secured (statutory abolition; judicial reinterpretation; a replacement liability architecture routing accountability through the department or the political community rather than shielding the individual officer from all exposure), together with the powers of civilian review boards, the use of independent prosecutors for police-misconduct cases, and the design of transparent discipline-record systems — not whether immunity from consequence may stand. The institution must be accountable to the political community it serves.

Together, these seven conditions are what enforcement as constitutive infrastructure structurally requires: each indispensable, substantive enforcement architecture coming only when the whole set holds. [§9.12.3](<9.12.3 What is Predicted.md>) draws its predictions from that conjunction.


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← [9.12.1 What is Disputed](<9.12.1 What is Disputed.md>) | [9.12.3 What is Predicted](<9.12.3 What is Predicted.md>) →
