Table of Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1. Groundwork
- 2. The Argument
- 2.1 The S5 Pipeline
- 2.2 Cartesian Certainty
- 2.3 Necessary Possibility of Change
- 2.4 Structural Requirement
- 2.4.1 Constituting Modal Structure
- 2.4.2 Structural Gap
- 2.4.3 Demand Instantiation
- 2.4.4 Something Must Be
- 2.4.5 Forward Conditional
- 2.4.6 Succession Requires Temporality
- 2.4.7 Distinction Requires Spatiality
- 2.4.8 Exchange Requires Physicality
- 2.4.9 Forward Conditional Necessity
- 2.4.10 Sufficiency of Structure
- 2.4.11 The Frozen-World Test
- 2.4.12 The Masking Test
- 2.5 Triconditional Necessity
- 2.6 Triconditionality of Nature
- 2.6.1 Three Conditions, One Nature
- 2.6.2 Succession’s Two Conditions
- 2.6.3 Extension’s Two Conditions
- 2.6.4 Persistence’s Two Conditions
- 2.6.5 Mutual Containment
- 2.6.6 Modal Identity
- 2.6.7 Triconditional Cross-Entailment
- 2.6.8 Ontological Identity
- 2.6.9 Triunity of Nature
- 2.6.10 Triconditional Identity
- 2.6.11 No Fourth Condition
- 2.6.12 Necessity’s Nature
- 2.7 Nothing to Consider
- 2.8 The Whole Line
- 2.9 Precedent Convergence
- 2.10 Three Logical Strata
- 3. Convergence
- 4. Metaphysical Rivals
- 4.1 Modal and Semantic Foundations
- 4.1.1 Rigid Designation
- 4.1.2 Two-Dimensional Semantics
- 4.1.3 Principle of Sufficient Reason
- 4.1.4 Humean Contingency
- 4.1.5 Information-Theoretic Foundationalism
- 4.1.6 Quinean Modal Skepticism
- 4.1.7 Modal Conventionalism
- 4.1.8 Metaontological Deflationism
- 4.1.9 Wittgensteinian Quietism
- 4.1.10 The Source of Possibility
- 4.1.11 Pizzi’s Impossibility of Nothingness
- 4.1.12 Dispositionalism about Modality
- 4.1.13 Modal Epistemology and the Remoteness Objection
- 4.1.14 Impossible Worlds and Relative Modality
- 4.2 Time, Change, and the Changeless
- 4.3 Physics and Mind
- 4.3.1 The Hard Problem of Consciousness
- 4.3.2 Eliminativism and Illusionism
- 4.3.3 Russellian Monism
- 4.3.4 Cosmopsychism
- 4.3.5 Idealism
- 4.3.6 The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics
- 4.3.7 Mathematical Universe Hypothesis
- 4.3.8 Non-Locality, Branching, and the Particle Concept
- 4.3.9 Structural Realism
- 4.3.10 Bundle and Trope Theory
- 4.3.11 Mereological Nihilism
- 4.3.12 Haecceitism
- 4.4 Modal Variants and Extensions
- 4.4.1 Modal Realism
- 4.4.2 Linguistic Ersatzism
- 4.4.3 Combinatorialism
- 4.4.4 Modal Fictionalism
- 4.4.5 Modal Expressivism
- 4.4.6 Necessitism
- 4.4.7 Sider’s Structuralism
- 4.4.8 Whiteheadian Process Metaphysics
- 4.4.9 Modal Collapse Objection
- 4.4.10 Gasking’s Parody of the Ontological Argument
- 4.4.11 Chisholm’s Paradox and the Chained-Origin Counterexamples
- 4.5 What the Rivals Carried
- 4.1 Modal and Semantic Foundations
- 5. Rival Ultimates
- 5.1 Theistic Arguments for a Divine Ground
- 5.1.1 Rasmussen’s Foundation Argument
- 5.1.2 Cosmological Argument
- 5.1.3 Simultaneous Causation
- 5.1.4 Argument from Simplicity
- 5.1.5 Fine-Tuning Argument
- 5.1.6 Intelligent Design
- 5.1.7 Modal Ontological Argument
- 5.1.8 Modal-Grounding Argument
- 5.1.9 Transcendental Argument
- 5.1.10 Moral Argument
- 5.1.11 Pascal’s Wager
- 5.2 Doctrines of the Divine Nature
- 5.3 Non-Classical Ultimates
- 5.4 What the Rival Ultimates Carried
- 5.1 Theistic Arguments for a Divine Ground
- 6. Relocating Greatness
- 7. Nature Alone
- 8. Expanding the Field
- 9. Maximum Possibility
- Conclusion
- Excursus
- Coda
- Appendices
- Author’s Notes
- On Composition
- On Publication
- Acknowledgments
- Symbols
- Glossary
- Bibliography
- Index